In this study, we map and analyze the content and structural features of the Iranian Twittersphere as exhibited over the course of the 2016 legislative elections in order to identify the communities that developed around various political, social, and cultural issues and to assess the influence of online political campaigning that emerged on the platform over the course of the election campaign. Given Iran's ongoing efforts to control and restrict freedom of expression around numerous political, social, and cultural issues in public spaces, we are interested to assess how users make use of the uncensored space provided by Twitter to speak out about various contentious issues. We achieve this by engaging in network analysis and content analysis of tweets and media content posted over the course of the election period.
Although Twitter remains blocked by the Iranian authorities, the widespread use of circumvention tools by Iranian citizens has allowed them to make use of it as a free and open space for public engagement around contentious and divisive political and social issues. Using a mixed-methods approach combining social network analysis with qualitative content analysis of election-related content of the Iranian Twittersphere during the elections, we identify and analyze 46 clusters of users ranging from human rights activists through to reformist and conservative political commentators, technology advocates, and literature enthusiasts. In addition to these interestbound clusters, we also observe that the network is home to extensive networks of everyday users, who share jokes, idle chatter, and flirtatious messages. Although the Twittersphere hosts a significant volume of political content, it is by no means a purely political space.
The intense online activity of the Iranian diaspora and the extent of its engagement with digital networks of activists and journalists inside the Islamic Republic is another major feature of the Iranian Twittersphere that we explore in this study-we observe that the level of interconnectedness between diasporic and domestic networks is remarkably high, indicating that the Iranian Twittersphere offers more than just an uncensored space for activists inside Iran, but provides Iranians in exile with the opportunity to engage with the development of political and social discourses inside the country.
We find that the scale of Twitter activity amongst diaspora Iranians and more liberal segments of Iranian society has had two major impacts upon the political makeup of the Twittersphere: firstly, a general politicization of the Twittersphere; and secondly, the squeezing out of politically divergent voices-especially from conservative factions, who appear to have found their home on alternative (unblocked) social networking sites. Although it does not necessarily hold a hugely politically diverse or representative chunk of Iranian netizens, the Iranian Twittersphere does function as an important bridge to connect the country's vast diaspora networks to politically engaged, reformist-leaning citizens living inside Iran.
Originally spoken by the Islamic Republic's founder Ayatollah Khomeini, the official slogan of the 2016 elections translates roughly as: 'Only the nation's vote matters.'
Iran possesses one of the most far-reaching and sophisticated systems of information control in the world today. Iran's extensive program of online censorship has seen it labeled as an ' enemy of the Internet' by Reporters Without Borders 1 and described as the 'least free' country in terms of internet freedom by Freedom House between 2011-14 2 (surpassed only by China in its 2015 report
3
). In response, Iranian tech activists in Iran and the diaspora have collaborated to develop tools and strategies for evading censorship, and as a consequence VPN usage in the country is sky-high-the Iranian Students' News Agency reported in 2014 that just under 70% of young Iranian internet users employ circumvention tools to access restricted content.
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Despite the challenges of censorship, Iranians have long taken to online spaces to express their opinions on contentious political, cultural, and social issues. For many years, Iran's blogosphere-or 'Blogestan' -was one of the largest and most vibrant online public spaces in the world. In 2008, the Berkman Center for Internet & Society undertook a comprehensive analysis of the Iranian blogosphere, finding a politically and culturally diverse ecology comprised of reformists, conservatives, literature enthusiasts, and religious youth.
5 However, since 2008 Iran's online ecology has undergone a series of dramatic changes, triggered in part by the development of new platforms, and in other ways by the intensification of online censorship in the wake of the 2009 post-election unrest.
Introduction
Since 2008 the Persian-language blogosphere has been in terminal decline. The Iran Media Project's 2014 report 'Whither Blogestan?' described how the meteoric rise of social networking sites (SNSs) such as Facebook and Twitter had delivered a mortal blow to Iran's blogosphere, 6 owing to these sites' interactivity, accessibility, and ability to embed and share media content seamlessly. This trend has continued despite the Iranian government's aggressive campaign to block access to many globally popular SNSs inside the country, including Twitter-the microblogging service that was credited by numerous observers for playing a significant role in the post-election unrest of 2009.
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This study assesses the composition and character of the Iranian Twittersphere over the course of the hotly contested 2016 parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections. It does so by mapping the communities that have developed around different political, cultural, and social issues and exploring the activity patterns of the platform's users. In this way, we demonstrate how the Iranian Twittersphere is an ideologically diverse network of individuals and communities who are using the platform to advance particular social and political causes (while sharing plenty of cat pictures along the way). The 2016 elections offered an excellent opportunity to monitor the volume and significance of political activity on Twitter during a period of heightened political engagement. What we found over the course of this study is a highly politically engaged, and heavily reformist-leaning network of Iranian citizens and diaspora-based users.
When protests erupted in the streets of Tehran following the disputed presidential elections of 2009, many Western commentators were quick to celebrate Twitter's role in the uprising. Former US national security adviser Mark Pfeifle went so far as to suggest that the popular micro-blogging site should get the Nobel Peace Prize because "without Twitter the people of Iran would not have felt empowered and confident to stand up for freedom and democracy. "
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The widespread perception that Twitter was integral to the protests prompted an official at the US state department to ask Twitter to postpone scheduled maintenance in order to keep the platform online for Iranian users. 9 Everyone seemed to agree that Twitter was a crucial enabler of the movement.
The celebratory discourse about Twitter revolutions almost certainly overstated Twitter's role in the uprising
10
. 
Twitter in Iran Today
While the world's attention has moved on from its intense focus on the use of [ Figure 1 .1] -Iranian President Hassan Rouhani tweeting at Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey
The use of English indicates that these profiles are not primarily aimed at a domestic audience. Yet it appears that the Iranian government has recognized the value of using Twitter to get its message out. This does not mean that Twitter will be officially unblocked anytime soon; although there were reports that Twitter briefly became accessible without circumvention tools following the implementation of the 2015 nuclear agreement, it appears this was more likely the result of a technical glitch than a deliberate policy decision.
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Twitter remains reasonably popular among ordinary Iranians. According to the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Twitter has over 4 million Iranian users.
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The platform has hosted discussions on a wide range of topics, from travel tips 17 to internet censorship, 18 the refugee crisis, 19 and the nuclear deal.
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Iranians have also been adept at using Twitter for campaigning. Last year, Iranian netizens successfully used the platform to lobby Twitter executives to add Iran to Twitter's mobile list, where users can add their mobile numbers in order to enable 2-step verification.
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While the resulting shift to Twitter's registration policy had little political significance (though it did improve security for Iranian users), it does suggest that Twitter does give Iranians a venue in which to organize and push for policy changes. It is perhaps because of this capacity that Twitter remains a sensitive 15 Small Media, "Iranian Internet Infrastructure and Policy Report, December 2015 ", (January 2016 ), p. 8 last accessed: 5/11/2016 16 "More than 14 million Iranians are on Viber, Facebook and Twitter", ILNA 02/06/2015 , last accessed: 5/11/2016 , http://brk.mn/ilna2015 17 "Must See Iran on Twitter", Financial Tribune 10/16/2014 , last accessed: 5/11/2016 , http://bit. ly/MSeeIr14 18 Small Media, "Iranians' Best Five Reactions to Iran's Crappy Internet", (2015 ), last accessed: 5/11/2016 , http://bit.ly/cppynetnov 19 Small Media, "Iranians Tweet On: The Refugee Crisis", (2015 ), last accessed: 5/11/2016 , http:// bit.ly/itorfg 20 Small Media, "Iranians Tweet On: The Deal", (2015 ), last accessed: 5/11/2016 The analysis in this study is based on a mixed methods research protocol that includes qualitative content analysis of Persian-language Twitter supported and guided by algorithmically drawn network maps and a diverse set of quantitative metrics calculated for each of the clusters in the network. This methodological approach builds upon similar efforts in the past to map online discussion spaces that correspond that correspond to particular geographic areas.
25
We began by generating a social network map of Persian-language Twitter accounts based on the follow relationships between users (see Figure 4 .1). The network structure is visualized using a physics model layout algorithm (FruchtermanRheingold), overlaid with colors representing each account's assignment to a group based on a clustering of network relationships. The resulting network map and structures that emerge reflect the individual decisions of Twitter users to follow other users, and the work of the algorithm that transforms these follow relationships into clusters.
In the visualizations, each node represents a single user account, and the size of each node reflects the number of followers from the network to that account. The location of each node relative to the others is based on the collective follow decisions of all of the nodes in the network. Accounts that are linked by a follow relationships are pulled together as though by a spring or forced of gravity. Densely interconnected network neighborhoods "bunch up" in the map. In this way, one can think of the map as a picture of the pattern of influence and information flow in the network.
The location of nodes on the map is based on follow relationships and reflects longer term stable relationships. Drawing a map based on mentions and retweets would put more emphasis on shorter term interests, influenced more by the content of tweets within the period in which data are collected.
25 Bruce Etling, John Kelly, Robert Faris, and John Palfrey, "Mapping the Arabic Blogosphere: Politics and Dissent Online, " New Media & Society 12 (2010 ), pp. 1225 -1243 
-Our Process
Determining the accounts that populate the map is based on a multistage process for collecting relevant accounts and removing nodes that are less connected with the core network. In the beginning of January, Small Media and Graphika worked together to develop a 'seed list' of several hundred Persian-language Twitter accounts, based on Small Media's knowledge of the Iranian Twittersphere and previous analysis undertaken by Graphika. This set was expanded by adding all of the followers of the seeds, and then reduced by removing all accounts with no activity over the prior 90 days. A clustering algorithm assigns each node in the map to a particular cluster, which are represented by different colors. These clusters are based on commonality in outward facing attention. Accounts that use similar language (including hashtags), interact with the same accounts, and share the same URLs are drawn together.
A variety of metrics are calculated to help researchers understand and describe the contours and structures of the map. These metrics provide a quantitative measure of which activities occur proportionately more often in each cluster compared to the others, including:
• Twitter accounts followed • Twitter accounts mentioned, retweeted, and replied to within a timeframe • URLs cited in tweets • Words used, including bigrams and trigrams (pairs and triples)
• Countries, cities, and other locations mentioned in user profiles
Researchers apply labels to each of the clusters based on a review of this data. These labels are not meant to categorize each account within a given cluster but rather offer concise shorthand descriptions for the various clusters. The clusters vary by the interests and perspectives of the users in each cluster, though some clusters do overlap in the topics that they discuss. Each user offers a unique perspective that does not necessarily map perfectly with the set of common themes found in each cluster. For many of the accounts within a cluster, the cluster label offers a good summary of the primary focus and general orientation of the account; for other accounts, the cluster label may not strongly capture the interests and views of the user.
The first iteration of this map included 40 clusters, which Small Media categorized into nine thematic groups: Our research uncovered 46 clusters of users within our network, of which a large number overlapped in terms of frequently posted content and the types of discussions and user engagements that took place. As a consequence, a number of these clusters have been grouped together in our analysis to ensure clarity in the narrative overview below.
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The Iranian Twittersphere
G R O U P C L U S T E R D E S C R I P T I O N

Politics & Activism
Core Influencers
Highly influential accounts that broadcast to large audiences but do not engage with other users directly.
International Human Rights
A collection of international and diaspora-based Iranian HROs, along with prominent human rights activists in exile.
Mujahedin-e Khalq An isolated cluster of MEK-aligned activists and automated bot accounts.
Opposition & Reformist Activists
Diaspora-based human rights activists and organizations, generally advocating for political change inside Iran.
Reformist & Diaspora Media
Afghan Media A peripheral cluster of Afghan journalists and media consumers.
Diaspora Media (2) Iranian diaspora news agencies and television networks and their followers.
Shargh Journalists & Reformists
Dominated by journalists from the reformist newspaper Shargh.
Iranian Journalists & Diaspora Media
A mixture of reformist-leaning journalists from Iran and the diaspora.
Diaspora Commentariat A tight community of high-profile diaspora journalists, activists, and political commentators.
Opposition & Reformist Journalists
A mixture of reformist journalists and media commentators more harshly critical of the Islamic Republican system.
Reformist Journalists (2) Clusters of reformist journalists and media consumers, predominantly based inside Iran.
Mixed Media Consumers A loose cluster of low-influence media consumers.
Conservative Media
Conservative Media Dominated by conservative journalists and critics of the Rouhani administration.
Clerics & Hardline Media 
Cultural & Social Issues
Iranian Musicians A cluster dominated by a number of Iranian bands and independent musicians.
Literature & Poetry (5) Clusters in which users share literary quotes and poetry. Most quotes are from Persian poets (classical and modern), but some Englishlanguage literary content is also shared.
Mixed Literature & Politics
Mixed cluster of literature-and poetry-sharing users, and users engaging with (predominantly reformist) politics.
Nostalgic Periphery
Peripheral users sharing poetry, literature, and historical images. Some users are supporters of the deposed Pahlavi dynasty.
Porn Consumers
Users in this segment share social content and limited pop culture content. They also mention and retweet pornographic content more than any other cluster in the network.
Social Issues & Daily
Tweets (5) Users in these mixed groups tweet about pop culture, literature, social issues, and some political issues.
Vocal Critics
A cluster dominated by harsh critics of the Islamic Republic. Users in this cluster are tightly bound, with high levels of density and reciprocity.
Mixed Users
Daily Tweets (9) Users in these clusters typically share updates about their lives, daily observations, and some limited engagement with social and political issues.
[ Figure 4 . 
Politics & Activism
Clusters in the Politics & Activism group are fairly diverse, but include key political figures in the Iranian establishment, high-profile opposition and reformist activists, and a handful of international human rights organizations.
Users in these clusters post frequently about ongoing political developments and human rights issues, including freedom of expression, press freedom, minority rights, and political prisoners. Many Iranians in these clusters are critical of the Islamic Republic's institutions and leaders, and advocate for political change. Many of these political commentators and activists are Iranians living in exile, including former Green Movement activists, nationalists, and royalists. This group also contains a cluster of dedicated Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) supporters. The Politics & Activism group contains the lowest number of users who publicly state they live inside Iran, at 30.7%. This is compared to 42.3% of users who state that they live outside the country.
The central cluster of Core Influencers is made up of accounts with very high numbers of followers and very low numbers of followed accounts. These include the accounts of President Hassan Rouhani (English-and Persian-language), Supreme Leader Khamenei, news agencies such as Deutsche Welle Persian and Radio Farda, and the women's rights activist Masih Alinejad.
Although these accounts have little in common thematically, they are all 'broadcaster' accounts in that they produce information to large networks of followers without having any great interest in interacting with other users-they are information disseminators, not consumers.
The International Human Rights cluster contains a number of diaspora-based human rights organizations, including civil society organizations Tavaana and TavaanaTech, United4Iran, and the Iranian Human Rights Documentation Center (HRDC). It also contains a number of diaspora-based Green Movement-aligned accounts including 'PersianBanoo' and 'Madyar, ' as well as the account of the deposed Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, who now positions himself as a human rights advocate.
Core Influencers Opposition & Reformist Activists International Human Rights Mujahedin-e Khalq
There is some crossover between the previous cluster and the Opposition & Reformist Activists cluster, which also contains a number of online activists closely associated with the Green Movement. This cluster appears to be made up of a mixture of Iran-based and diaspora-based activists.
Although the clusters in this group all advocate for some variety of political change in Iran, they are poorly connected with each other, and there are few indicators of significant cooperation. As well as posting tweets critical of Iran's human rights record, a number of users in this cluster post GIFs, videos and cartoons mocking Iranian politicians.
News sources particularly influential amongst activists in these clusters include opposition-leaning sources, including the online-only reformist ). However, these efforts are rarely reciprocated, and consequently the MEK cluster is the most densely connected one in our entire network (signaling insularity).
Posts by MEK users frequently include pictures of Maryam Rajavi speaking at MEKorganized events. These images often contain quotes from her speeches in which she denounces the Islamic Republic, and calls for political change in Iran. Even during the election campaign, few posts commented directly on the elections, and images of Maryam Rajavi remained dominant (see Figure 4. 3). 
Reformist Journalists & Diaspora Media
The Reformist Journalists & Diaspora Media group and the clusters within it constitute the largest politically focused community in the Iranian Twittersphere, at 21.9% of the total network. It is largely composed of influential reformist-leaning journalists and media figures (and their followers) from Iran and the wider diaspora. The clusters within this group generally display low levels of density, pointing towards higher levels of connectivity and information exchange between users across different clusters and groups.
Indeed, one of the most striking things about this group is the entangled nature of the networks of diaspora-based and Iran-based journalists. Eight of the clusters in this network contain a majority of accounts based outside Iran, suggesting that Iran's reformist and opposition media ecology is very much global in character. This is not necessarily surprising: many reformist journalists were forced into exile after the 2009 presidential elections but retained networks and professional relationships with journalists continuing to work inside the country.
The cluster demonstrating the highest density rate is the Diaspora Commentariat. This cluster contains a number of high-profile Iranian journalists in the diaspora, including former Voice of America correspondent Negar Mortazavi, Radio Free Europe's Golnaz Esfandiari, Al Monitor's Arash Karami, and The Guardian's Saeed Kamali Dehghan. It also contains a number of reporters from the London-based BBC Persian and Manoto networks. The higher density in this network is suggestive of a relatively tightly knit community of diaspora-based news-shapers and reporters. All 30 of the most frequently used terms in this cluster were English-language terms, including 'nuclear, ' 'implementation, ' ' candidates, ' and 'Zarif, ' illustrating the political and geopolitical focus of many users in this cluster, and their largely Western audiences.
Another relatively tight-knit group is Shargh Journalists & Reformists, which is generally dominated by Shargh journalists including Fatemeh Jamalpour and Asal Abasian, but also includes the accounts of diaspora-based Radio Zamaneh and Turkey-based Iranwire journalist Reza Haghighatnejad. The Diaspora Media clusters are naturally dominated by the official accounts of diaspora-based news agencies such as BBC Persian, Voice of America Persian, and Manoto1. Interestingly, the official account of Foreign Minister Javad Zarif was drawn into this cluster, and sits in essentially the same position as BBC Persian in our network map, suggesting that these accounts exert similar levels of influence over roughly comparable networks. Although these clusters are dominated by influential diaspora-based TV networks, more than half of users in them state that they are located inside Iran (51.9%), demonstrating diaspora media's influence within the Islamic Republic (this figure is likely to be higher in reality, as many accounts do not share location information).
Discussions in these clusters are broadly political in nature, and focus more on day-to-day political developments when compared to the more human rightsfocused activities of users in the Politics and Activism group. Over the course of the election campaign users in these clusters posted about developments in the race, documented the voting process on election day, and shared results as they came in. There were widespread fears among reformists that low turnout might boost the chances of a conservative victory. Reformists previously boycotted legislative elections in 2012, resulting in an overwhelming electoral victory for conservatives. Images of respected civil rights activists such as Emad Bahavar and cultural giants like Hushang Ebtehaj supporting reformists in the election lent the race legitimacy among segments of society that might otherwise be hostile to the political institutions and opaque electoral processes of the Islamic Republic.
Reformist Twitter campaigns are covered in greater depth in Chapter 5, where we take a look at some of the turnout-boosting initiatives that were undertaken by reformists on Twitter.
Conservative Media
The network of conservative journalists and their followers is the smallest within our network, comprising just 3.3% of the accounts in our network. Compared with reformist and opposition activists, conservative commentators have a somewhat limited presence in the Iranian Twittersphere. Additionally, they are more densely connected than the networks of reformist activists, demonstrating a degree of insularity and isolation from the wider Twitter network.
This isolation is not particularly surprising, and bears out the findings of previous research on this topic. Small Media's 2013 report on conservative online activism-'Unmasking the Arzeshi' -suggested that Iran's conservatives rarely took to Twitter, and that their content output on the platform was rather minimal, in preference to other platforms such as domestic SNSs and Google+ (which remains unblocked).
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Looking at the extent of conservative activity in this network, it appears that little has changed in this regard, and engagement remains somewhat limited compared to other political communities on Twitter. Users also frequently link to the religious seminary news service Hawzah News.
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Notable users include the cleric Mohsen Lahootian, the religious artist and designer Hossein Samadzadeh, and cleric Ebrahim Nasiri. The most frequently used term by this segment was 'Saud, ' illustrating the group's focus on the sectarian/geopolitical struggle between Iran and regional nemesis Saudi Arabia. Other common terms includ ' Al Nimr' (the Shi'a leader executed by Saudi Arabia in January 2016), 'martyrdom, ' 'martyrs, ' and 'jihad. '
Compared with the reformist group, engagement with the elections remained fairly low, though a handful of higher-profile users did post election-related content on a semi-regular basis. Engagement on election day initially started out somewhat hopeful, with users promoting the value of participating in Iran's electoral processes. In this vein, cleric Mohsen Lahootian shared an image of his ballot paper with his followers, explaining his vote for the conservative list (see Figure 4 .8).
Later in the evening however, as the results began to trickle in, conservatives took to Twitter to express their dismay at the outcome. Conservative journalist Abbas Hosseinejad tweeted in exasperation on election night: "I seek refuge in God at the initial reports!" On February 26 the Iranian electorate delivered a stunning defeat to conservatives. The trend was especially pronounced in Tehran, where conservative political giants such as Mohammad Yazdi and Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi were unceremoniously dumped by the electorate in favor of a coalition of reformists and moderates.
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In the face of an active and well-organized reformist online campaign, conservatives attempted to mobilize on Twitter and wage something of a smear campaign against their political opponents (albeit with limited success). Conservative Twitter campaigns are covered in greater depth in Chapter 5.
42 Afsaran, last accessed: 5/11/2016 , www.afsaran.ir 43 Khamenei.ir, last accessed: 5/11/2016 , www.khamenei.ir 44 Hawzah News, last accessed: 5/11/2016 Nima Akbarpour commented little during the election campaign itself, but posted on election night to say "In my opinion the #results hashtag is about to get hot. We'll track it…. " Jadi linked to a blog post in which he argued that people should engage in more regular acts of political and social engagement, and not attribute sole importance to electoral politics, whereas Mehdi Saharkhiz shared an image suggesting that Iran's parliamentarians be sent to the 'Recycle Bin' (see Figure 4 .10).
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Based on our appraisal of Iran's Twittersphere, literary content continues to make up a significant chunk of the map-the group of clusters in which users predominantly share Cultural and Social Content is the largest in the network, taking up 36.5% of the total area. It should be noted that posting and resharing literary content is often just one component of many users' posts-many of the users in these groups also share updates from their daily lives, tweet at their friends, share jokes, and flirt with strangers.
Users in the Literature & Poetry clusters typically alternate between sharing original poetry and quoting the works of Iran's literary giants, from Hafez and Ferdowsi through to modernists like Farrokhzad. Some of this poetic content is political in character, although much is not, and is posted alongside otherwise banal daily observations. Although the larger and more influential users in this segment post literary content and poetry very regularly (for example, @miladsaqa and @Gabr_1989), the majority of other users in this sphere do so relatively infrequently, and also post a variety of political and apolitical content from daily life.
There is also a very loosely bound cluster of users composed in significant part of Iranian Musicians, including the hip hop artist Hichkas, producer Mahdyar Aghajani, and Iranian music blog Moltafet. These users are distributed all over the Twittersphere, presumably drawn towards clusters containing significant segments of their audiences. The Nostalgic Periphery are a cluster of loosely connected users on the edge of the network who largely share social content, although a number of users are also prone to posting historical images of Iran, sweeping landscapes, and (amongst a minority of users) images of the deposed Mohammad Reza Shah. Many of the most influential users in this cluster post very infrequently, and this group is generally quite inactive.
Another cluster in this group is composed of Satirists & Critics who are openly hostile to the Iranian government. These include users such as MAGNAghermez and ser_serpico. Users in this cluster alternate between discussing popular culture and engaging in heated criticisms of the Iranian establishment, posting satirical images and mocking figures from across the political spectrum. This cluster is one of the densest in the network, and users within it display higher levels of mutuality tendency than any other cluster in the network. This suggests that the users within the cluster comprise a tightly knit and generally non-hierarchical community of friends and associates.
One cluster in this group is notable for its remarkably high levels of consumption of pornography. The Porn Consumers cluster disproportionately follows accounts that share pornographic images and videos-they follow primarily English-language accounts, but also a number of accounts that provide Persian-language content. This cluster is not particularly dense, with users scattered throughout the broader group.
Mixed Users
This large grouping is a mixture of everyday users, making up 19.2% of the total network.
The clusters within contain a varied mixture of everyday users, the majority of whom lack strong identifiable characteristics. Users in these clusters post daily observations about their lives, chat with their friends, flirt with strangers, and share humorous videos and images. Although they sometimes engage with topical issues and news events, they are generally less interested in such topics compared to the more overtly political segments of the network. 
Network Structures -Cluster Densities & Mutuality
The structure of Twitter clusters can provide some important insights into the nature of the communities studied, as noted by Smith et al's development of six conversational archetypes on Twitter.
47 We expect to see a variety of different community types within our network, based on differing densities and levels of reciprocity.
Cluster density measures the level of connectivity among nodes in a particular network, and can be calculated as the number of connections between users in a cluster as a proportion of the total possible number of connections. As stated in Smith et al, "The thicker/denser the group, the more people inside it are connected to each other and the less connected they are to people outside their group,
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indicating community insularity. "
The measurement of mutuality tendency provides evidence for the levels of twoway information exchange and user engagement within a community. We based this measure on Li, Zhang, and Bao's method for assessing cluster-based mutuality tendency, 49 which calculates how likely the cluster members are to form reciprocal relationships, relative to a random baseline. Values of 0 mean that reciprocal relationships are random chance (the cluster represents a loose association of people with shared interests, e.g., followers of a particular pop star who don't know each other); values close to 1 would mean the relationships are much more likely than random chance (the cluster represents a cohesive community, e.g., a social activism group); and those close to -1 would mean the relationships are much less 47 Marc A. Smith, Lee Rainie, Itai Himelbolm, Ben Schneiderman, "Mapping Twitter Topic Networks: From Polarized Crowds to Community Clusters", Pew Research Center, (2014) likely than random chance (the cluster is dissociative, e.g., politically divergent groups that pay attention to the same news stories).
Mixed Users
Daily Gauging the locations of users in our network is a complicated task, and owing to many users' reticence about listing their location publicly, it is impossible to build a complete picture of their distribution around the world. 40.3% of users are identifiable by the time zone listed in our dataset. For those listing the 'Tehran' time zone, we applied the tag 'Inside Iran, ' and for those outside, we applied the tag 'Outside Iran. ' Then we looking at user-specified location data, which was provided by 48% of the remaining untagged users in our network. We manually tagged these users based on the information they provided.
After completing this step, we were left with 22.6% of users who either did not provide any identifying location data, or provided ambiguous information such as 'Somewhere, ' 'Nowhere, ' or 'Neverland. ' We found that 50.7% of users stated they lived inside Iran, and 26.7% stated they lived outside the country.
Users from the Technology group were the most likely to state they lived inside Iran, likely in part stemming from the generally apolitical nature of their activities, and users' interest in building their profile and engaging with the country's growing tech sector. Users from the Politics and Activism and Reformist & Opposition Media were the least likely to state a location inside Iran, possibly owing to the dangers of engaging in openly political activities and human rights activism in the face of extensive online surveillance. The user is anonymous, and most of his tweets express his hostility to the regime. He mocks the Iranian political system, along with assorted other public figures and celebrities.
Opinion Shapers -20 Influential Users
The majority of the top 20 users in our network originate from politically focused networks-14 users are located in the Politics & Activism and Reformist & Opposition Media clusters. Notably, none of the top users in our network are members of the Conservative Media cluster, nor do any prominent conservative politicians feature in this top set (Supreme Leader Khamenei-the highest-ranked conservative politician in our dataset-only managed 31st place. The top-ranked user from the Conservative Media cluster attained 517th place overall).
These rankings once again demonstrate the disproportionate influence of reformist-leaning political activists, journalists, and human rights activists in the Iranian Twittersphere. Only one user in this list-Dr. Farhang Holakouee-posts content that is consistently apolitical in nature. 
farsnews.com
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Fars News Agency is a hardline conservative news agency which is politically close to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), generally promoting conservative and hardline policy.
The most linked-to media sources in our network are alternative SNSs, demonstrating the interconnected nature of Iran's social media ecology. YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, Vine, Soundcloud, and Swarm all feature prominently, although a number of these platforms are blocked. Notable by their absence are Iran's domestically developed social media platforms, such as Facenama or Afsaran, Instagram analogue Lenzor, or the Iranian version of YouTube, named Aparat. Although the Iranian government has a long track record of filtering internationally developed SNSs in order to push users towards Iran-hosted (and thus more easily surveilled) alternatives, 50 such efforts appear to have made little headway within this network. (Of course, the Iran-based users in this network are already users of circumvention tools-otherwise they wouldn't be able to access Twitter in the first place.)
Also notable in these rankings is the significance of international media sources for Iranian users. Shargh (reformist newspaper) and Fars News (conservative news agency) are the only two Iranian outlets to make the top rankings. This is against seven international news outlets and newspapers ranging from the BBC, to The Guardian, through to Reuters. What is also interesting is that so few of these news sources are censored by the Iranian government-the Washington Post and BBC are the only two to be blocked. Given that the other Western media sources in this list frequently criticize Iran's human rights record and lack of political freedoms, the blocks imposed on certain outlets do appear to be somewhat arbitrary.
The arbitrary nature of censorship is reflected in the blocking of SNSs and communications services. Although Instagram and Telegram are home to a variety of users and groups critical of the Islamic Republic, and to sexual content and other content deemed unacceptable to the Iranian authorities, they remain unblocked, while Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter are censored. Regardless, among this network the state's efforts appear to have a minimal effect on user behaviors-Facebook and YouTube remain the most influential information sources in the network.
[ Figure 5 .1] -Online Campaigns -Total Tweets
We've established some of the broader characteristics and structural features of the Iranian Twittersphere, and have identified some of the key information sources and influential figures dominating the network. Now we turn to assess how different user groups engaged with discussions around the parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections of February 2016.
Through this study, we sought to identify patterns in user activity on Twitter-did it appear that Iranians were actively engaged in election-related conversations on Twitter, or was the platform being used primarily as a 'news feed' for politically engaged activists? And did political campaigning take root on the platform, or has Twitter been surpassed by other SNSs?
-
Online Campaigns and Usage Patterns [Figure 5.2 
Campaign 1: The List of Hope
In the absence of a rigid party system in Iran, candidates for legislative elections often run on electoral lists (or slates)-groups of candidates that align themselves with each other in an effort to boost their collective chances of electoral success. One such list-deemed the 'List of Hope' ‫)لیست_امید(‬ by former reformist President Mohammad Khatami-was at the core of reformists' and moderates' political hopes in the 2016 legislative elections. Grouping together the last remaining reformist candidates who survived the Guardian Council's pre-election electoral purge with moderates and 'least-worst' conservatives, the List of Hope was backed by Khatami, Rouhani, and Rafsanjani to deliver victory to as many non-hardliners as possible.
On Twitter, the 'List of Hope' was mentioned numerous times within the core of the network, and was shared by a number of key opinion shapers including BBC Persian, Cafe, and Negar Mortazavi. In addition, it spread throughout the 'Cultural and Social Content' and 'Mixed Users' groups (see Figure 5 .2). By the end of the election campaign, users were emphasizing the importance of voting by citing examples of political dissidents and prisoners who had chosen to vote for the 'List of Hope. ' Prior to the election there was a great deal of debate about the value of voting in the wake of the Guardian Council's mass disqualification of reformist candidates.
[ Figure 5 .4] -A user shares the 'List of Hope' with their followers Figure 5 .5 is a post from a user describing how imprisoned human rights activist Narges Mohammadi cast her vote for the list from inside Evin Prison. Such tweets aimed to puncture cynicism around the elections, and demonstrate that even the most hardcore activists were willing to engage with the Islamic Republic's political system to ensure a rout of hardliners.
[ Figure 5 . [ Figure 5 .7] -Foreign Minister Zarif calls for voters to vote 'intelligently' to bring about positive change Activists had been mobilizing on Twitter for some time prior to Zarif's tweet to encourage moderate and reformist voters to turn out at polling stations. Figure  5 .8 is a post from a reformist-leaning journalist quoting a speech from hardliner Ahmad Jannati about the imprisoned leaders of the Green Movement. In it, he says: The phrase 'I repeat' was the subject of a number of memes on Iranian SNSs, with a number of high profile Iranians, including actress Baran Kosari, taking to the mobile app Dubsmash to lip sync to Khatami's speech.
Although Dubsmash posts were widespread on Facebook, on Twitter the 'I repeat' meme took other forms. As visible in Figure 5 .10, the term was repeated widely across the whole network, including the less overtly politically engaged 'Pop Culture and Literature' and 'Mixed Users' clusters.
Sadra Mohaqeq, the Society Editor for the reformist newspaper Shargh, posted a tweet imitating Khatami's language to mock the government's deployment of bulk SMS messages containing ' election hadiths' in an attempt to boost turnout (see Figure 5 .11).
[ Figure 5 . These accusations were first made by hardliners after a speech delivered by Khamenei in which he warned voters against being influenced by foreign powers and the BBC, 53 but these accusations quickly made their way to social media platforms, where they became a discussion topic for conservatives and incredulous supporters of the List of Hope. Whereas the 'English List' was fairly widely discussed across the network (see Figure 5 .12), the 'No2UK' campaign was effectively isolated to the conservative sectors of the Twittersphere from which it originated (see Figure  5 .13). 
"How was the 'English List approved by the Guardian
-Conclusion
This study has shown that the Iranian Twittersphere is a very different digital space than the Iranian blogosphere surveyed eight years ago. The segment of the Twittersphere examined in this study is largely political and effectively unipolar, being populated largely by reformist-leaning journalists, activists, and media consumers. Conservative users generally occupy spaces on the margins of the network, where they have formed generally quite insular communities, along with other 'fringe' political movements such as the Mujahedin-e Khalq and its collection of die-hard activists and spam bots.
The dominance of Iranian reformists and anti-establishment activists is reinforced by the size and strength of the Iranian diaspora in the Twittersphere and the level of its engagement with in-country journalists and activists. The high proportion of political activists and reformist-leaning journalists based outside Iran is even higher than we expected going into this project, and the extent of Iranian engagement with non-Iranian media sources is another interesting feature demonstrating the international character of Iran's political Twittersphere.
We also found that Twitter was a significant staging post for digital campaigners seeking to influence the outcome of Iran's legislative elections, although our impression was that it was something of a peripheral battleground: visual media shared on Twitter frequently contained links to Telegram groups and Facebook pages, suggesting that these alternative platforms (with greater popularity than Twitter inside Iran) were home to the more intensive campaigning efforts by political activists.
Aside from political purposes, we found that the Iranian Twittersphere is home to a large community of technology experts, bloggers, and entrepreneurs-some with a political focus (i.e. combating internet censorship and online filtering)-but many seemingly working within Iran's much-hyped tech sector. Although many users are tightly networked with diaspora-based tech accounts, the majority of users in the Technology group are based inside Iran, suggesting that many young tech enthusiasts see a bright future for the country's start-up scene.
It would be inaccurate to describe the Iranian Twittersphere as an entirely representative or accessible public space. The predominance of political contentfor the most part reformist in character-and the marginalisation of conservative voices is demonstrative of this (this is a feature that appears specific to Twitterconservatives have colonized Google+ in much the same way, whereas Facebook appears to harbor a more diverse and depoliticized user base, though further research would be required to confirm this). The lack of sizeable conservative communities arises less as a result of overt pressure from reformist-leaning users however, and is more likely a consequence of the government's decision to filter Twitter, while leaving Google+ and domestic social networks unblocked. We would hypothesise that conservative activists and journalists are less likely to make use of circumvention tools to evade state information controls, and so might be expected to congregate on online platforms not proscribed by the government.
The demographics of Iranian Twitter are also likely out of sync with Iranian society as a whole. While a large segment of the network only infrequently engages with political matters, users generally appear to be well-educated and are clearly techsavvy enough to use circumvention tools to get onto Twitter in the first place. Given the challenges of accessing Twitter for many older and less tech-savvy Iranians, the membership of the Twittersphere is therefore likely to be skewed towards younger, more educated citizens who are willing and able to circumvent the government's censorship system.
Our experiences in undertaking this study have illuminated some potentially rewarding future avenues of research that may provide valuable new insights into the usage of digital public spaces by Iranian citizens. The first and most pressing need is for alternative SNSs to be analyzed-first and foremost Iran's Facebook ecology, which appears to be the most well-developed in Iran by some distance. Another high priority candidate for mapping is the Persian-speaking Telegram network. Unfiltered in Iran, Telegram is a communication platform that has seen meteoric growth in the past year, attracting a massive influx of Iranian users from all political and social backgrounds, and promoted by reformist and conservativeleaning media outlets and platforms. Mapping Telegram would perhaps offer the first opportunity to sketch out the features of a widely popular, and entirely uncensored Iranian digital public space.
